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Abstract—Industrial Wireless Sensor Network (IWSN) is an
emerging class of a generalized Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
having constraints of energy consumption, coverage, connectivity,
and security. However, security and privacy is one of the major
challenges in IWSN as the nodes are connected to Internet and
usually located in an unattended environment with minimum
human interventions. In IWSN, there is a fundamental require-
ment for a user to access the real-time information directly
from the designated sensor nodes. This task demands to have
a user authentication protocol. To satisfy this requirement, this
article proposes a lightweight and privacy-preserving mutual user
authentication protocol in which only the user with a trusted
device has the right to access the IWSN. Therefore, in the
proposed scheme, we considered the physical layer security of the
sensor nodes. We show that the proposed scheme ensures security
even if a sensor node is captured by an adversary. The proposed
protocol uses the lightweight cryptographic primitives, such as
one way cryptographic hash function, Physically Unclonable
Function (PUF) and bitwise exclusive (XOR) operations. Security
and performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is
secure, and is efficient for the resource-constrained sensing
devices in IWSN.
Index Terms—Industrial Wireless Sensor Network, Mutual
authentication, Key agreement, Physically unclonable function,
Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Wireless Sensor Network (IWSN) value
proposition has evolved from simply extending or replacing
wired networks to cloud-connected smart object intelligence.
Internet Protocol (IP) addressability to the node, reliable mesh
networking, field-bus tunneling, proven battery lifetime, and
new cloud capabilities are now part of the IWSN landscape.
Due to the advancement of the sensing technology, WSNs
are becoming important as the Internet provides access to
digital information anywhere. Today’s sensor networks can
provide remote interaction with the outside physical world.
This proliferation of WSNs has enabled several new classes
of applications that benefit a large number of applications [1].
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Many industrial control systems use WSN in the following
applications:
• Environmental sensing: It is one of the basic WSN
applications, which is widely used in almost every field of
industry. The main objective in the environmental sensing
is an efficient information gathering used both for the
prevention (real-time or postponed) as well as analysis.
• Condition monitoring: It covers the applications of
structural condition monitoring [2], [3], health monitoring
in Wireless Body Sensor Network (WBSN) [4] and also
machine condition monitoring in an industrial control
system.
• Process automation: It provides the information regard-
ing the resources for the production and service provision
[5]. In some cases, WSNs can be used for the production
performance monitoring, evaluation and improvement.
In IWSNs, the collaborative nature allows many potential
advantages over traditional wired industrial monitoring as well
as control systems, such as self-organization, flexibility, rapid
deployment and inherent intelligent-processing capability [21].
Thus, WSN plays a crucial part in building a highly depend-
able and self-healing industrial system that can answer to
the real-time events in quick time. Hence, it is argued that
in order to realize the visualized industrial applications and
effective communication protocols, we require the advantages
potential gains of WSN [21]. Because of unique characteristics
and technical challenges, developing a WSN for industrial
applications needs a combination of expertise from various
stakeholders (Academia and industry) which are outlined as
below [21]:
• The industrial expertise as well as knowledge are needed
for application-specific domain.
• The sensor-technology expertise is required to understand
various issues related to sensor calibration, transducers as
well as clock-drift.
• The Radio Frequency (RF) design and propagation envi-
ronment expertise is needed to deal with the communi-
cation challenges and RF interference issues in industrial
environments.
• The networking expertise is also essential in order to
understand the hierarchical network architectures, which
are required for IWSNs to furnish adaptable and scalable
architectures for the heterogeneous applications.
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Recently, there is a rapid growth of global IWSN market
which is mainly attributed to high reliability of wireless tech-
nology compared to wired technology. Furthermore, growing
trend of smart factories, low cost of wireless sensor nodes and
faster deployment are predicted in favor of the WSN market
growth. Moreover, growing security concern for automation
industry coupled with increasing adoption of sensor networks
in order to monitor various processes spurs the demand of
IWSNs. On the contrary, availability of multiple wireless
communication standards is also expected to have an adverse
impact on IWSNs market. The technological advancements
in wireless communication and energy consumption without
losing accuracy are some of the factors that may disclose new
avenues for IWSN market in the near future.
A. Related Work
Since the sensor nodes in IWSN have limited computational
and storage capabilities, a lightweight authentication and key
agreement protocol is preferred in such a network. In 2006,
Wong et al. [6] presented a user authentication scheme for
IWSN based on symmetric-key cryptography. In 2007, Tseng
et al. [7] showed that the scheme presented by Wong et
al. is susceptible to various attacks (e.g., replay and forgery
attacks). Independently, Das [8] found that Wong et al.’s
scheme is vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks and then he
introduced a new protocol. However, this protocol cannot
ensure some of the important security properties, such as
mutual authentication and key agreement. Moreover, later
studies [9], [10] revealed that the protocol presented in [8] is
also vulnerable to insider attacks and impersonation attacks. In
2012, Das et al. [11] and Xue et al. [12] separately proposed
two lightweight authentication protocols. However, Turkanovic
and Holbl [13] proved that Das et al.’s scheme has some
security flaws. In 2013, Li et al. [14] also demonstrated that
Xue et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider attacks, and they
proposed a new scheme to address the vulnerabilities found in
Xue et al.’s scheme. In 2014, Turkanovic et al. [15] proposed
a new authentication scheme. Chang et al. later pointed out
that Turkanovic et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation
attacks. After that, they presented an improved scheme. After
thoroughly investigating, we find that the protocol presented in
[16] cannot ensure untraceabilty property, because, in the login
message, the parameter MIi is fixed for two different sessions.
Therefore, an adversary can easily comprehend that both mes-
sages belong to the same user. In this way, an adversary can
trace the activities of the user. Recently, Gope and Hwang [17]
introduced an anonymous mutual authentication protocol for
the real-time data access in IWSN. However, their scheme does
not support the anonymity of the sensor nodes. The sensors
in IWSN are often deployed in the open hostile environment.
Hence, there is a possibility of physical and cloning attacks.
However, like the other existing protocols in WSN, Gope and
Hwang’s scheme cannot ensure the physical security of the
sensor nodes either.
B. Motivation
IWSNs offer several benefits in many industrial control
systems and various real-time applications. In IWSNs, the
sensor devices share the information with each other using
a public channel (i.e., the Internet). Therefore, security and
privacy of the shared sensing data remains a paramount
concern in IWSNs. An intruder (adversary) can gather and
aggregate the traffic information in order to make the profile
of an industrial plant’s activities (i.e., production status).
For sensitive applications in IWSNs (for example, IWSN-
based healthcare environment), this type of profile making is
dangerous. In addition, if the confidential industrial plant’s
information is leaked, the private information can be also
exposed to some malicious users. As a result, the security
and privacy are important in IWSN-based applications.
In order to access the real-time information directly from
some designated sensor nodes in IWSNs, a user first needs
to be authenticated by the gateway. Only after mutual authen-
tication among the user and the accessed sensor node with
the help of the gateway node, both parties establish a session
key between them. Using the established session key, they can
communicate securely each other. A user authentication is very
much needed in IWSNs to protect the security and privacy,
because the private (confidential) industrial plant’s information
must be preserved and protected from any adversary. However,
designing such a user authentication scheme in IWSNs is
a challenging task due to resource-limitations of the sensor
nodes and vulnerability of physical capturing of the sensor
nodes by an adversary.
C. Research Contributions
This article proposes a lightweight and physically secure
anonymous mutual authentication protocol for real-time data
access in IWSN. The proposed scheme is based on lightweight
cryptographic primitives, such as one-way cryptographic hash
function, physically unclonable function (PUF) [18] and bit-
wise XOR operations, which have limited computational over-
head, and hence, it is suitable for the resource-constrained
sensing devices in IWSN. The key contributions of this article
are summarized as follows:
• A computationally efficient lightweight mutual authen-
tication scheme has been designed that allows only a
legitimate user with a trusted device to access the IWSN.
• Physical security of the user’s device as well as the
sensor nodes deployed in the open hostile environment
is ensured in the proposed scheme.
• In the proposed scheme, we do not require to store any
sensitive information, such as secret credentials on the
sensing devices.
• The formal security analysis under the widely-used
Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [20] ensures the session
key (SK) security of the proposed scheme. To further
strengthen the security of the proposed scheme, the infor-
mal (non-mathematical) security analysis is also carried
out.
• A detailed performance analysis and comparison with
the existing schemes show that the proposed scheme is
suitable for the resource-constrained sensor nodes.
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D. Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. In Section
II, we define the system and adversary models applied for the
proposed scheme. In addition, we also provide a brief intro-
duction to PUFs in this section. In Section III, the proposed
scheme is described in detail. The security and performance
analysis of the proposed scheme are discussed in Section IV
and Section V, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first discuss the system model for IWSN
and then the adversary model needed for the proposed scheme.
Moreover, we briefly discuss the important properties of PUFs.
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, our system model for IWSN consists
of five major entities: a set of sensors, a set of base stations, a
gateway node, a control and monitoring unit, and a set of users.
A user may wish to access the real-time data directly from the
sensor nodes. A set of sensors are deployed in a target field
(e.g., industrial plant) for environmental and condition moni-
toring and/or process automation purpose. Sensors collect data
from their surrounding environment and periodically transmit
them to the gateway (via the nearest base station). After that,
the gateway forwards the collected data to the control and
monitoring unit through a secure channel. Before receiving
any data, the gateway needs to validate the legitimacy of
the sensor nodes. In this regard, the gateway also checks
whether a sensor node has been physically tampered or not.
On the other hand, in many critical applications [4], [17],
the users from outside may require to obtain access of the
real-time information directly from the sensor nodes instead
of the gateway node. An example includes the IWSN-based
healthcare environment, where sensors collect the real-time
information, such as temperature, blood pressure and pulse
rate from a patient’s body. After that, a legitimate medical
professional, say a doctor, with a trusted device can get access
of these data directly from the sensor nodes. However, before
offering any secure direct access of a sensor node, the gateway
needs to verify the legitimacy of the user and the gateway also
needs to help both the user and the sensor node to establish
a session key. So that, they (user and the sensor node) can
securely communicate.
B. Adversary Model
We assume that an adversary A can intercept the transmitted
messages communicated over public channel. In addition, A
can alter or delete the message contents transmitted over the
insecure public channel as per as the Dolev-Yao (DY) threat
model [22]. We further assume that sensors may be deployed
out in the open environment and these are not physically
protected. Therefore, A can easily access the sensors and
these are subject to physical and cloning attacks. Besides, it
is assumed that the user’s device is not physically protected.
A having the access to the user’s trusted device may try
Figure 1. System model for an industrial wireless sensor network
to extract information stored in the device. In addition, A
may also attempt to extract sensor data by using an untrusted
device. Here, the A’s objective is to launch an undetectable
attack to authenticate itself with the gateway or any one of
the registered deployed sensors, which could be dangerous
for IWSN applications. For example, if A can authenticate
itself and gain access to a sensor connected to a patient’s
pacemaker in the IWSN-based healthcare environment, he/she
can cause danger to the life of the patient. Finally, as in
[24], the gateway needs to be physically secured by putting it
under a locking system inside the IWSN so that the physical
capture of the gateway will be much difficult as compared
to that for the sensor nodes and the user’s device. Thus, the
gateway is considered as a fully trusted node and it will not
be compromised by A.
C. Evaluation Criteria
The authors in [34] made a substantial step towards breaking
the vicious “break-fix-break-fix" cycle in the existing two-
factor authentication research domain for IWSNs. Wang and
Wang [35] provided a criteria set, which is originally proposed
for a generic client-server architecture. Later, Wang et al. [34]
also suggested a comprehensive criteria set of the following
independent evaluation metrics for designing a user authenti-
cation scheme in IWSNs:
• No password verifier-table: Neither the gateway nor
the sensor nodes should store the passwords related
information in the verifier-table.
• Password friendly: A user should be permitted to select
his/her password and also to change it freely at any time.
• No password exposure: A user’s password should not
be extracted or derived by the privileged administrator
even if the administrator is treated as a trusted authority
in the network.
• No smart card loss attack: Having the lost or stolen
smart card of a registered authorized user, an adversary
should not be able to change the password, recover the
password in offline, online or hybrid guessing attacks.
In addition, having the extracted information from the
lost/stolen smart card, the adversary should not be able
to impersonate a victim to login to the system. Hence, it
is important that a user authentication should be resilient
against the smart card loss attack.
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• Resistance to various attacks: A user authentication
scheme in IWSNs should protect various attacks, such
as impersonation, offline guessing, replay, man-in-the-
middle, parallel, key control, stolen verifier, unknown key
share and known key attacks.
• Provision of key agreement: A registered user and
a sensor node should be able to establish a session
key among them after their mutual authentication for
subsequent communication.
• Sound repairability: A user authentication scheme
should support smart card revocation and dynamic sensor
node addition phase after the initial deployment of the
sensor nodes in IWSNs.
• No clock synchronization: A user authentication needs
not be affected by clock synchronization and time delay.
Hence, the sensor nodes, users and gateway nodes need
not be synchronized always in the design of a user
authentication scheme in IWSNs.
• Mutual authentication: A user, the gateway node and a
sensor node in IWSNs can authenticate each other during
the authentication process.
• Timely typo detection: In the event of wrong input
credentials of a user, such as identity and password by
mistakes, he/she will be timely notified.
• Forward secrecy: A user user authentication scheme de-
signed for IWSNs should provide perfect forward secrecy.
• User anonymity and untraceaility: A user authenti-
cation scheme in IWSNs should provide user identity
protection as well as untraceability.
Next, devices in IWSN are often deployed in the open
and public places, which may cause them to be vulnerable
to physical and cloning attacks. Therefore, it is important
that any security solution designed for IWSN should not only
consider all the aforesaid evaluation metrics but also detect
any violations of physical security of the IWSN devices.
D. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
In this section, we provide a short description of PUF. A
PUF is a one-way function that maps a set of challenges to a
set of responses based on the unique physical micro structure
of a device. In general, an ideal PUF has the following
properties:
• The output of the PUF always depends on a physical
system.
• It is easy to evaluate and construct.
• PUF output is unpredictable and works as a random
function.
• PUF is uncloneable.
A challenge-response pair (CRP) is used to characterize a PUF.
It takes a random bit-string as an input challenge and produces
an arbitrary bit-string, called the response. The response R of
a PUF, say P to a challenge C can be defined as R = P (C).
PUFs are a result of the manufacturing process of Integrated
Circuits (ICs) which introduces random physical variations
into the microstructure of an IC, making it unique. These
variations in the microstructure of an IC cannot be controlled,
making them virtually impossible to clone or duplicate. PUFs
Table I
NOTATIONS
Notation Definition
U A user in IWSN
Sn A sensor node in IWSN
IDu Identity of U
pswu Password of U
βu Biometric thumb impression of U
IDSn Unique identity of Sn
TIDu Temporary identity of U
PID Pseudo identity of U
CRP(C ,R) Challenge-response pair
P Physically uncloneable function
h(.) One-way cryptographic hash function
⊕ Bitwise XOR operator
|| Concatenation operator
are ICs which use their internal structure to provide a one-
way function that cannot be duplicated. The fact that PUFs are
hard to predict but easy to construct and evaluate makes them
a good choice for use as security primitives for lightweight
devices. Since the PUF output depends on its unique physical
characteristics, any attempt to tamper with the PUF alters
behavior of the device and renders the PUF useless [18].
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed scheme which
consists of four phases: i) user registration phase, ii) sensor
node registration phase, iii) authentication phase, and physical-
temper checking, and iv) secure periodical data collection
phase.
The important notations used to describe the proposed
scheme are listed in Table I. In the proposed scheme, a user’s
biometric thumb impression and password have been used for
local authentication of password and biometric by the user’s
device. Nowadays, most of the mobile devices can be equipped
with the biometric scanner so that a user’s biometric thumb
impression can be imprinted easily in the devices to overcome
the cost of sensing infrastructure in our proposed scheme.
Hence, the proposed scheme is suitable for use with the critical
applications as well as general purpose applications in the
IWSN domain.
A. Assumptions for the Proposed Scheme
In our proposed scheme, we make the following assump-
tions:
• Each user device and the sensor consist of a microcon-
troller attached to a PUF.
• It is also impossible to tamper with the communication
between the micro-controller and its PUF [18], [19].
• User device and sensors have limited resources while the
gateway has no such limitations.
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B. Phase I: User Registration Phase
Assume that a user U wants to obtain the real-time data
access in IWSN. Then, he/she needs to register his/her trusted
device D in the gateway. As shown in Fig. 2, the procedure
of user registration is described as follows.
Step 1: U selects an identity IDu and transmits {IDu ,
Regreq} to the gateway through a secure channel, where
Regreq denotes the registration request.
Step 2: Upon receiving the registration request message,
the gateway generates a random challenge Cu for normal
authentication process. To address the issue of desynchroniza-
tion or Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [17], the gateway also
generates a set of new challenges C synu = {c1, . . ., cn} for
resynchronization with the user U and sends the information
{Cu , C synu } to U through the secure channel.
Step 3: After receiving {Cu , C synu }, the U ’s trusted device
extracts the PUF outputs Ru = PD (Cu ), Rsynu (r1, r2, . . .,
rn) = PD (C synu ) and sends {Ru , R
syn
u } to the gateway.
Step 4: Hereafter, the gateway randomly generates a unique
temporary identity TIDu and a set of unlinkable pseudo
identities PID = {pid1, pid2, . . ., pidn} and transmits {TIDu ,
PID} to U . The gateway stores {(IDu ,TIDu , (Cu , Ru ),
(C synu , R
syn
u ), PID} for further communication with U .
Step 5: Upon receiving {TIDu , PID}, U stores them
in his/her device. Next, U inputs his/her biometric thumb
impression βu into the device. The device extracts αu =
PD (βu ) and then the user U selects a password pswu, and
inputs pswu into the device. The device computes and stores
δ = h(αu||pswu ) for user verification.
Figure 2. Registration phase of a user U
C. Phase II: Sensor Node Registration Phase
While a new senor node Sn is deployed, it is needed to
register Sn in the gateway. The entire registration process of
a new sensor node can be discussed as follows.
Step 1: The gateway first generates a challenge CSn for
the interaction with the sensor node Sn. Next, to address the
issue of desynchronization or DoS attacks, the gateway also
generates a set of new challenges C synSn = {c1, . . ., cn} for
resynchronization with Sn and transmits {CSn , C
syn
Sn } to Sn
through a secure channel.
Figure 3. Registration phase of a sensor node Sn
Step 2: Sn extracts the PUF outputs RSn = PSn (CSn ),
RsynSn = PSn (C
syn
Sn ) and sends {RSn , R
syn
Sn } to the gateway.
Step 3. Next, the gateway generates a unique identity
IDSn for the sensor Sn and stores {IDSn , (CSn , RSn ),
(C synSn , C
syn
Sn )} in its database for further interaction with Sn.
However, Sn does not require to store any secret credentials
in its memory. The summary of this phase is depicted in Fig.
3.
D. Phase III: Authentication Phase
Assume that a user U wants to obtain real-time data
access directly from a particular sensor node in IWSN, then
he/she requires to accomplish mutual authentication with the
gateway and the desired sensor node. The process of mutual
authentication and key agreement is described as follows. The
summary of this phase is also provided in Fig. 4.
Step 1: U first inputs his/her biometric thumb impression
βu into his/her device. After that, the device extracts the PUF
output αu = PD (βu ) and asks the user U to enter his/her
password. U then inputs his/her password pswu into the device
and the device calculates δ∗ = h(αu|| pswu ) and compares
the computed δ∗ with the stored δ. If they are not equal, the
device terminates the session. Otherwise, the device believes
U as a legitimate user. Next, the device generates a nonce
Nu and selects the temporary identity of the user U as TIDu ,
and sends the login message {TIDu , Nu} through a public
channel.
Step 2: After receiving the login message, the gateway first
locates the TIDu in its database. The gateway then selects
the CRP (Cu , Ru ) and generates a nonce Ng , and calculates
N ∗g = Ng⊕Ru , V0 = h(N ∗g ||Ru ||Nu ). Finally, the gateway
composes the authentication request message MA2 : {Cu , N
∗
g ,
V0} and sends it to the user U through a public channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message MA2 , the U ’s trusted
device extracts Ru = PD (Cu ) and verifies the parameter
V0. If the verification is successful, the device calculates
Ng = N
∗
g ⊕Ru , C newu = h(Cu || Ru ), Rnewu = PD (C newu ).
Next, the device asks U to input his/her identity IDu and
the identity IDSn of the accessed sensor node, say Sn,
that he/she wants to access. The device then computes
R∗u = h(IDu ||Ru )⊕Rnewu , ID∗Sn= h(IDu ||Ng )⊕IDSn , V1=
h(R∗u ||Ru ||Ng ||ID
∗
Sn ) and sends the authentication response
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Figure 4. Lightweight and physically secure anonymous authentication protocol for secure real-time data access in IWSN
message MA3 : {R
∗
u , ID
∗
Sn , V1} to the gateway through a
public channel.
Step 4: After receiving the authentication response mes-
sage MA3 , the gateway verifies the key-hash output V1. If
the verification is successful, the gateway derives IDSn =
h(IDu ||Ng )⊕ID∗Sn and selects the CRP (CSn , RSn ). Next,
the gateway generates a random number n1 and the ses-
sion key SK, and then calculates n∗1=n1⊕RSn , SK ∗Sn =
h(Rsn ||n1)⊕SK, V2 = h(n∗1 ||RSn ||SK ∗Sn ||TIDu ). Finally, the
gateway composes a message MA4 : {TIDu , n
∗
1 , SK
∗
Sn , CSn ,
V2} and sends it to the sensor Sn through a public channel.
Step 5: Upon receiving the message MA4 , the sensor Sn
first extracts the PUF output RSn = PSn (CSn ) and then
verifies the parameter V2 . After successful verification, the
sensor Sn computes n1 = n∗1⊕RSn , SK = h(Rsn ||n1)⊕SK ∗Sn ,
C newSn = h(CSn || RSn ), R
new
Sn = PSn (C
new
Sn ), R
∗
Sn =
h(RSn )⊕RnewSn , V3 = h(R∗Sn ||RSn ||n1). Next, the sensor
composes a message MA5 : {R
∗
Sn , V3} and sends it to the
gateway through a public channel.
Step 6: On receiving the message MA6 , the gateway verifies
the parameter V3. If the verification is successful, the gateway
calculates C newSn = h(CSn || RSn ), R
new
Sn = h(RSn )⊕R∗Sn ,
C newu = h(Cu || Ru ) and R
new
u = h(IDu ||Ru )⊕R∗u . The
gateway also generates a new temporary identity for the
user U as TIDnewu and computes SK
∗
u = h(IDu || Ru ||
Ng )⊕ SK, TID∗u = h(IDu || Ru || TIDu )⊕TIDnewu and V4 =
h(TID∗u ||SK
∗
u ||Ru ). Finally, the gateway composes a message
MA6 : {TID
∗
u , SK
∗
u , V4} and sends it to the user U through
a public channel. After that, the gateway stores {TIDnewu ,
(C newu , R
new
u ), (C
new
Sn , R
new
Sn )} for further interactions with
the user U and the sensor node Sn.
Step 7: Upon receiving the message MA6 , the user U ’s
device validates the parameter V4. If the validation is suc-
cessful, the device computes the session key SK = h(IDu ||
Ru || Ng )⊕SK ∗u , TIDnewu = h(IDu || Ru || TIDu )⊕TID∗u and
stores TIDnewu for the further communication with the user
U .
Remark 1: It is worth noting that in case if the gateway
cannot find the TIDu in its database, the gateway will ask the
device to try with a valid unlinkable pseudo identity pidj ∈
PID . In that case, the gateway will select one of the unused
CRP from (C synu , R
syn
u ). Similarly, if there is any loss of
synchronization between the sensor node Sn and the gateway,
this can be apprehended if the gateway cannot receive the
response message MA5 within the maximum round-trip time
period. Then, the gateway will select of the unused CRP from
(C synSn , C
syn
Sn ) for authentication process and after completion
of the authentication process, the gateway needs to delete that
particular used CRP from its database.
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Figure 5. Physical-temper checking and secure periodical data collection
phase
E. Phase IV: Physical-temper Checking and Secure Periodical
Data Collection Phase
In this phase, the gateway will periodically check whether
a sensor node Sn has been physically tampered or not. More-
over, by using the following mechanism, both the gateway and
sensor Sn mutually authenticate each other and establish the
session key sk between them. Then, the sensor Sn will use
this session key sk for securely sending its collected data to
the gateway. As shown in Fig. 5, the procedure of this phase
associated with the proposed scheme is described as follows.
Step 1: The gateway generates a nonce Ng and selects
the CRP (CSn , RSn ). Next, the gateway calculates N ∗g =
RSn⊕Ng , ResGW = h(RSn ||N ∗g ) and sends the message
{CSn , N ∗g , ResGW} to the sensor Sn through a public channel.
Step 2: Upon receiving {CSn , N ∗g , ResGW}, the sensor
Sn first extracts the PUF output RSn = PSn (CSn ) and then
verifies the parameter ResGW. If the verification is successful,
Sn generates a nonce Ns and calculates Ng = RSn⊕N ∗g ,
C newSn = h(CSn || Ns ), R
new
Sn = PSn (C
new
Sn ), x = R
new
Sn ⊕Ng ,
N ∗s = Ns⊕h (RSn ||Ng ), ResSn = h(N ∗s ||x ||RSn ), and the
session key sk = h(Ns ||Ng ||RSn ). Finally, the Sn composes a
message {N ∗s , x , ResSn} and sends it to the gateway through
a public channel.
Step 3: After receiving the response message from the
sensor node Sn, the gateway first verifies the parameter ResSn.
If the validation is successful, the gateway computes Ns
= N ∗s ⊕h(RSn || Ng ), C newSn = h(CSn || Ns ), RnewSn = x⊕Ng ,
and the session key sk = h(Ns ||Ng ||RSn ). Finally, the gateway
stores {C newSn , R
new
Sn } for further interaction with the sensor
node Sn.
Remark 2: Wang and Wang [29] analyzed several two-factor
authentication schemes in WSNs and came up with a general
principle that the public-key techniques are intrinsically in-
dispensable to build a two-factor authentication scheme for
supporting user anonymity property. In the proposed three-
factor authentication scheme, the temporary identity TIDu of
a user U is used instead of using the original identity IDu in
the communicating messages to provide user anonymity prop-
erty. Also, the temporary identity is renewed for each session
to provide the untraceability property. Thus, considering the
resource limitations of sensor nodes in IWSN, the lightweight
operations like one-way hash function h(·) and PUF are
used instead of using expensive public-key techniques. Of
course, the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is feasible for
resource-constrained WSNs [30] though it is not as lightweight
as one-way hash function and PUF. Hence, to achieve a
strong user anonymity property it is required to use public
key techniques (for example, ECC) for IWSN [31].
Remark 3: In this article, we have constructed a privacy-
preserving scheme by using lightweight hash functions and
PUFs, and pre-loading a pool of pseudonym identities. If the
pseudonym ID pool is large, the large storage capacity is
needed. If the pool is small, the device of a user U needs
to update frequently. Since the device is not resource-limited
as compared to a smart card, the approach of pre-loading
pseudonym identities in the proposed scheme will not be a
limitation.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we formally analyze the security of the
proposed scheme. In this context, we consider the broadly-
accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model provided in [20].
Moreover, we also informally (non-mathematically) analyze
the security of the proposed scheme.
A. Security Model
We now discuss the ROR model [20] in the following.
Participants: Let ΠtSnj be the t-th instance of the sensor
node Snj , ΠuUi the u-th instance of the user Ui and Π
v
GW the
instance v of the gateway GW.
Partnering: ΠtSnj is said to be partner of Π
u
Ui
when partial
transcript of all messages exchanged between the user Ui and
the sensor Snj is unique. The communication for the current
session is defined by a session id sid.
Freshness: If the session key SK between Ui and Snj is
not divulged to an adversary A, the instance ΠuUi or ΠtSnj is
said to be fresh.
Adversary: Under the ROR model, A cannot only read
the transmitted messages, but also can modify, delete or
change the message contents during the communication. In
other words, A is allowed to have full control over the
communication. Moreover, A will have access to the queries
defined below:
• Execute (Πt, Πu): With the help of this query, the trans-
mitted messages between the valid parties Ui and Snj
are intercepted by A. It is modeled as an eavesdropping
attack.
• Send(Πt,m): This query helps a participant instance Πt to
transmit a message m and also receives a message, which
is modeled as an active attack.
• CorruptDevice(Πu): It implements the user’s lost/stolen
device attack. Using this query, the secret credentials
stored in device are revealed to A.
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• CorruptSensor (Πt): This query models an attack in
which security credentials stored in the sensor node Snj
are also compromised.
• Test(Πt,Πu): The semantic security of session key SK
between Ui and Snj following the indistinguishability in
the ROR model [20] is implemented under this query. At
first, an unbiased coin c is flipped prior to beginning of
the game and the output is only secret to A. This value is
later utilized to verify whether the output of the Test query
is consistent. If A executes this query and it is found that
the session key SK is fresh, Πt or Πu delivers SK when
c = 1 or a random number when c = 0; otherwise, it
delivers ⊥ (null).
Semantic security of session key. Based on the ROR model,
the adversary A has to distinguish between an instance’s
actual session key and a random secret key. A can make the
Test queries to either Πt or Πu, and its output is checked
for consistency against the random bit c. Once the game
is over, A judges a guessed bit c’ for winning purpose. A
can win the game when c’ = c. The advantage of A in
breaking the semantic security of the proposed authenticated
key agreement protocol, say P in time t is denoted and defined
by AdvAKEP (t) = |2.P r[Succ]− 1|, where Succ represents an
event that A can win the game.
Random Oracle: In this article, the participants and the
adversary A have access to a collision resistant one-way
cryptographic hash function h(.) and the secure PUF function
P(.), which are further modeled by the random oracles.
B. Formal Security Analysis
To prove the semantic security of the proposed scheme, we
first define collision-resistant one-way hash function h(.), the
PUF function P(.) and also the properties of Zipf’s law in
passwords [26].
Definition 1 (Collision-resistant one-way hash function):
A collision-resistant one-way hash function h:{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n is a deterministic mathematical function that takes
a variable length input string and produces a fixed length
output string, say n bits. If AdvHashA (rt) denotes the ad-
vantage of an adversary A in finding a hash collision,
AdvHashA (rt)= Pr[(i1, i2 ) ∈RA : i1 6= i2 , h(i1 ) = h(i2 )]. An
(, rt)-adversary A attacking the h(·)’s collision resistance
means that AdvHashA (rt) ≤  with at most run time rt.
Definition 2 (Secure PUF function): We say PUF is a
secure PUF if the following requirement holds. For arbitrary
inputs C1, C2 ∈ {0, 1}k , the variation from the same inputs
is at most d1 and the variation from the different outputs is at
least d2, where d1 and d2 are security parameters. This implies
that for any two PUFs, say PUF1 (.) and PUF2 (.), and for any
input C1 ∈ {0, 1}k , Pr[HD(PUF1 (C1), PUF2 (C2 )) > d] =
1− ε, where HD denotes the hamming distance and d is the
error-tolerance threshold value.
The study conducted in [32] comprises anonymized pass-
word histograms representing almost 70 million Yahoo! users,
mitigating privacy concerns while enabling analysis of dozens
of subpopulations based on demographic factors and site usage
characteristics. Wang et al. [26] used the Zipf’s law that is
a vastly different distribution from the uniform distribution
for the user-chosen passwords. Actually the size of password
dictionary is much constrained in the sense that the users may
not use the whole space of passwords, but rather a small space
of the allowed characters space [26]. We use the Zipf’s law
in proving the session key security of the proposed scheme in
Theorem 1, which is also applied in many recent authentication
protocols [27], [28].
Theorem 1: Let A be a polynomial time adversary running
in time t against our protocol P and l be the number of bits
in the biometric thumb impression βu. Then the advantage of
A in breaking the semantic security of the proposed scheme
for deriving the session key SK is estimated by
AdvAKEP (t) ≤
q2h
|Hash| +
q2P
|PUF | + 2 max
(
C ′ · qs′s ,
qs
2l
)
,
where qh , qP , qs , |Hash| and |PUF | denote the number of
hash queries, the number of PUF queries, the number of Send
quires, the range space of h(.) and the range space of P(.),
respectively, and C ′ and s′ are the Zipf’s parameters [26].
Proof 1: We follow the similar proof as presented in
[27], [28]. A sequence of five games, denoted by Gi , where
i = [0, 4], are defined for proving the session key security
of the proposed scheme. These games are essentials where
Succi denotes the event wherein the adversary A succeeds in
guessing the bit c in game Gi . The detailed description of
each game is given below.
Game G0 : It is considered as an actual attack by A against
the proposed authentication key exchange (AKE) scheme P
in the ROR model. Since the bit c needs to be chosen at the
start of G0 , it is clear that
AdvAKEP (t) = |2.P r[Succ0]− 1|. (1)
Game G1 : This game is modeled as an eavesdropping
attack in which A intercepts the transmitted messages MA1 :
{TIDu , Nu}, MA2 : {Cu , N
∗
g , V0}, MA3 : {R
∗
u , ID
∗
Sn , V1},
MA4 : {TIDu , n
∗
1 , SK
∗
Sn , CSn , V2}, MA5 : {R
∗
Sn , V3}, and
MA6 : {TID
∗
u , SK
∗
u , V4} during the authentication phase.
Under this game, A invokes Execute(Πt,Πu) query. After
that A makes the Test query to verify whether it is the
real session key SK or a random number. In our proposed
scheme, SK is computed as SK = h(IDu ||Ru || Ng )⊕SK ∗u
= h(Rsn ||n1)⊕SK ∗Sn . In this regard, the computation of SK
demands the exposure of the secret credentials IDu , Ru
and Rsn , and these credentials are unknown to A, where
only a legitimate user’s device and the intended legitimate
sensor node can compute the desired response Ru or Rsn .
Therefore, A’s probability in wining G1 by eavesdropping on
the exchanged messages in not increased. It then follows that
Pr[Succ1] = Pr[Succ0]. (2)
Game G2 : The difference between this game and the
previous game G1 is that the simulations of the Send and hash
queries are included in G2 . Therefore, it can be treated as an
active attack where A may try to fool a legitimate entity to
accept a message modified by A. Since all messages MA1 , . . .,
MA6 are constructed using the random secrets Ru and/or Rsn ,
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and no hash collision happens when A makes Send query with
help of h(.) query (see Definition 1). According to birthday
paradox, we have the following relationship:
|Pr[Succ2]− Pr[Succ1]| ≤ q2h /(2|Hash|). (3)
Game G3 : The difference between G2 and G3 is that
simulations of the Send and PUF queries are included in G3 .
Therefore, in a similar argument posed in G2 , due to the
secure PUF function (see Definition 2) we have the following
relationship:
|Pr[Succ3]− Pr[Succ2]| ≤ q2P/(2|PUF |). (4)
Game G4 : In this final game, the simulation CorruptDevice
and CorruptSensor are included. In this context, A can obtain
the information {TIDu , PID , δ} stored in the device of
the user Ui . But A cannot obtain any information from
CorruptSensor since the sensor nodes do not store any secret
credentials in our proposed scheme. A user uses both password
pswu and the biometric thumb impression βu ∈ {0, 1}l .
Due to use of PUF, the probability of guessing the thumb
impression βu is 12l [23].
A can try to guess low-entropy passwords using the Zipf’s
law on passwords [26]. If we only consider the trawling
guessing attacks, the actually the advantage of A will be over
0.5 when qs = 107 or 108 [26], [32]. When we further consider
the targeted guessing attacks (in which A can make use of the
target user’s personal information), the advantage of A will be
over 0.5 when qs ≤ 106 [33].
We also impose a restriction on the limited number of wrong
password inputs in the system. Since the games G3 and G4
are identical in the absence of the guessing attacks, it follows
that
|Pr[Succ4]− Pr[Succ3]| ≤ max
(
C ′ · qs′s ,
qs
2l
)
. (5)
Next, since all queries are made by the A, the last resource
for winning the game is random guessing the bitc after
invoking the Test query. Therefore, we have,
Pr[Succ4] =
1
2
. (6)
(1), (2) and (6) give the following relationship:
1
2
.AdvAKEP (t) = |Pr[Succ0]−
1
2
|
= |Pr[Succ1]− 1
2
| (7)
= |Pr[Succ1]− Pr[Succ4]|.
Applying the triangular inequality, and (3), (4) and (5), we
have the following result:
|Pr[Succ1]− Pr[Succ4]| ≤ |Pr[Succ1]− Pr[Succ3]|
+|Pr[Succ3]− Pr[Succ4]|
≤ |Pr[Succ1]− Pr[Succ2]|
+|Pr[Succ2]− Pr[Succ3]|
+|Pr[Succ3]− Pr[Succ4]|
≤ q2h /(2|Hash|) (8)
+q2P/(2|PUF |)
+ max
(
C ′ · qs′s ,
qs
2l
)
.
Finally, solving (7) and (8), we obtain the required result:
AdvAKEP (t) ≤
q2h
|Hash| +
q2P
|PUF | + 2 max
(
C ′ · qs′s ,
qs
2l
)
.
C. Informal Security Analysis
In this section, we also informally (non-mathematically)
analysis the security of the proposed scheme for the following
security features and attacks.
1) Attainment of Mutual Authentication: In the authentica-
tion phase of the proposed scheme, the user authenticates the
gateway by using key hash output V0 and the gateway also au-
thenticates the user by checking whether h(R∗u ||Ru ||Ng ||ID
∗
Sn )
matches with the received V1. However, without knowing
Ru it will be computationally infeasible for an adversary A
to forge the authentication message of a legitimate user or
gateway. Similarly, the sensor authenticates the gateway by
checking whether h(n∗1 ||RSn ||SK
∗
Sn ||TIDu ) matches with the
received V2 , and the gateway also authenticates the sensor by
verifying whether h(R∗Sn ||RSn ||n1) matches with the received
V3. On the other hand, in the physical-temper checking
and secure periodical data collection phase of the proposed
scheme, the sensor node authenticates the gateway by checking
whether h(RSn ||N ∗g ) matches with the received ResGW, and
the gateway also authenticates the sensor node by verifying
whether h(N ∗s ||x ||RSn ) matches with the received ResSn. In
this way, the proposed scheme ensures mutual authentication
property among the communicating parties.
2) Attainment of User Anonymity with Untracebility: In
order to accomplish user anonymity with untraceability, the
proposed scheme employs temporary identity TIDu as an
identifier in the transmitted message instead of the user’s
real identity IDu . Therefore, except the gateway, no one can
identify the user U . Moreover, since the temporary identity
(TIDu ) of the user U is randomly generated and changes after
completing of each session. Therefore, it is computationally
infeasible for an adversary to revive the user’s real identity
from the transmitted messages. On the other hand, in case loss
of synchronization or DoS attacks, the user U needs to use one
of the used pseudo identity pidj ∈ PID , and after that both
the gateway and the user need to delete that pseudo identity. In
this way, the proposed scheme ensures user anonymity along
with untraceability properties.
3) Attainment of Sensor Anonymity: In the proposed
scheme, when a user U needs to obtain data from a particular
sensor Sn, U encodes the real identity of the sensor Sn as
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Table II
COMPARISON BASED ON SECURITY FEATURES
Scheme I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 I11 I12 I13 I14 I15
Das et al. [11] X X × X × × X X X X X × × × ×
Turkanovic et al. [15] X X × × × × × X X X X × × X X
Chang-Le [16] × X X X X × X X × X X X × X ×
Gope-Hwang [17] X × X X X × X X X X X × × X X
Our X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Note: I1: user anonymity with untracebility; I2: sensor anonymity; I3: forward secrecy; I4: replay attack; I5: loss of device
attacks; I6: physical attacks; I7: man-in-the-middle attack; I8: no password verifier-table; I9: password friendly; I10: no
password exposure; I11: provision of key agreement; I12: sound repairability; I13: no clock synchronization; I14: mutual
authentication; I15: timely typo detection.
X: a scheme is secure against an attack or preserves a feature; ×: a scheme is insecure against an attack or it does not preserve
a feature.
Table III
COMPARISON BASED ON COMPUTATION COST
Scheme User Device Gateway Sensor Node
Das et al. [11] 11NH 11NH 6NH
Turkanovic et al. [15] 8NH 8NH 6NH
Chang-Le [16] 2NExp+7NH 9NH 2NExp+5NH
Gope-Hwang [17] 8NH 9NH 6NH
Our 3NP+ 6NH 9NH 2NP + 4NH
ID∗Sn = h(IDu ||Ng )⊕IDSn and sends ID∗Sn to the gateway.
Except the gateway, no one can decode IDSn from the ID∗Sn .
Moreover, the random number Ng changes in each session.
Therefore, h(IDu ||Ng ) is used as an effective one-time pad to
encode IDSn due to collision resistant property of one-way
hash function h(·) (see Definition 1). Hence, no adversary
can differentiate ID∗Sn = h(IDu ||Ng )⊕IDSn from a randomly
chosen string. As a result, the proposed scheme preserves the
senor anonymity too.
4) Attainment of Forward Secrecy: In the proposed scheme,
suppose an adversary A has obtained the PUF responses Ru
and RSn . However, A still cannot revive the session key
SK. After each successful session, the gateway also updates
its database with the new PUF responses Rnewu and R
new
Sn ,
which can not be obtained by A (see Definition 2). Hence,
the proposed scheme ensures forward secrecy property.
5) Protection Against Physical Attacks: Suppose an adver-
sary wants to perform physical tampering on the user’s trusted
device or a sensor node for his/her own profit. However, any
such attempt to tamper with the PUF will change the behavior
of the device and it will render the PUF useless. Due to this,
during the execution of the Phases IV and V in the proposed
scheme, the PUFs will not be able to produce the desired
outputs Ru = PD (Cu ) and RSn = PSn (CSn ). Therefore,
the gateway can comprehend such attempt of tempering, and
accordingly, it will take necessary action. Also, PUFs are safe
against cloning and a PUF cannot be recreated [19]. Therefore,
the proposed scheme is resilient against cloning attack.
6) Resistance to Loss of Device Attacks: In the proposed
scheme, only a legitimate user with his/her trusted device has
the right to access the IWSN. Suppose the user’s trusted device
is lost or stolen. Now, an adversary A may attempt to imper-
sonate as the legitimate user to get access the IWSN. In this
regard, when the device will ask A to input his/her biometric
thumb impression, A cannot input the same biometric thumb
impression βu into the device. Moreover, A does not know
the password pswu. Eventually, the device cannot compute the
same value of δ as stored in its internal memory and it will
not be able to incorporate with A to impersonate as a legal
user. Next, assume that A will try to perform side channel
attacks in order to obtain all the information stored in the
device. However, as we mentioned before, any such attempt
will change the PUF behavior [18] and it will render the PUF
useless. Therefore, the PUF will not be able to produce the
desired output Ru = PD (Cu ), which is essential to convince
the gateway and get access of the IWSN. It then follows
that the proposed scheme is resilient against lost/stolen device
attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of security features, computation, communi-
cation, and storage costs. To manifest the advantages of the
proposed scheme, we first compare our scheme with some
of the recently proposed schemes, such as the schemes of
Das et al. [11], Turkanovic et al. [15], Chang and Le [16],
and Gope and Hwang [17]. From Table II, we can see that
Chang and Le’s scheme [16] cannot ensure user anonymity
property (as discussed in Section I-A). In Gope and Hwang’s
scheme [17], the anonymity of the sensor nodes has not been
considered. It is also worth noticing that Das et al.’s scheme
[11] does not support the features I3, I5, I6 and I12-I15,
Turkanovic et al.’s scheme [15] does not support the features
I3-I7, I12 and I13, Chang and Le’s scheme [16] does not
support the features I1, I6, I9, I13 and I13, and Gope and
Hwang’s scheme [17] does not also support the features I2,
I6, I12 and I13. Nevertheless, none of the existing protocols
in WSNs can ensure the physical security of the sensor nodes
and user device. On the other hand, only the proposed scheme
designed in this article can prevent several imperative attacks
and fulfill the desirable security features.
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Table IV
COMPARISON BASED ON OVERALL COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COSTS OF USER AND GATEWAY
Scheme Computation Cost (User) Computation Cost (Gateway) Communication Cost (User) Communication Cost (Gateway)
Das et al. [11] 15.07 ms 7.48 ms 84 bytes 120 bytes
Turkanovic et al.[15] 10.96 ms 11.96 ms 80 bytes 136 bytes
Chang-Le [16] 25.31 12.64 ms 112 bytes 174 bytes
Gope-Hwang [17] 10.96 ms 6.12 ms 88 bytes 152 bytes
Our 10.8 ms 6.12 ms 88 bytes 160 bytes
Next, we compare the computation cost of the proposed
scheme with the prior related schemes [11], [15], [16], [17].
Table III shows the number of hash operations NH , modular
exponentiation operations NExp and PUF operations NP re-
quired by the proposed scheme and other schemes [11], [15],
[16], [17]. The results in this table show that the computation
cost of the proposed scheme is quite similar to that in the
scheme [17]. To evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of the computation costs at the user and
gateway, we first simulate the cryptographic operations used
in the proposed scheme and other schemes [11], [15], [16],
[17] on an Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machine with an Intel Core
i5-4300 dual-core 2.60 GHz CPU (operating as the gateway).
To simulate the user’s device, we use a single core 798 MHz
CPU and 256 MB of RAM. The simulation uses JCE library to
evaluate the execution time of several cryptographic operations
used in the proposed scheme and other schemes [11], [15],
[16], [17]. Here, for hash operation we consider the SHA-
256 [25]. In that case, each hash operation at the user device
and the gateway takes 1.37 ms and 0.68 ms, respectively.
Besides, for the PUF operation we consider the simulation of
an 128-bit arbiter PUF circuit on the MSP430 micro-controller
machine with 798 MHz CPU, where each PUF operation takes
0.43 ms. From Table IV, we can see that Chang-Le’s scheme
[16] takes more computation cost than other schemes, where
each modular exponential operation takes 16.84 ms. On the
other hand, Table IV shows that although the communication
cost of the proposed scheme is little higher than some of
the schemes, the computation cost of the proposed scheme
at the user and gateway is lower than the other schemes.
Next, we consider the computation and the communication
cost at the sensor node in the proposed scheme and other
existing schemes [11], [15], [16], [17]. In this regard, we
simulate the cryptographic operations used in the proposed
scheme and other existing schemes [11], [15], [16], [17]
on a modular sensor board MSB-430 with the T1 MSP430
micro-controller and the temperature sensor- TMP36. Here,
for the PUF operation we consider the simulation of an 128-bit
arbiter PUF circuit on the MSP430 micro-controller machine.
Based on the simulation results, the execution time of a hash
operation (SHA-256), modular exponentiation operation, PUF
operation are 1.37 ms, 16.84 ms and 0.43 ms, respectively.
Table V shows that the proposed scheme takes only 6.34 ms
to execute 2NP +4NH operations, which is significantly less
than that for the scheme [16] and other schemes. From Table
V, we can also see that in the proposed scheme a sensor
node needs to bear less communication cost as compared to
other schemes. Furthermore, since in the proposed scheme the
Table V
COMPARISON BASED ON SENSOR NODE’S COMPUTATION,
COMMUNICATION, AND STORAGE COSTS
Scheme Computation Communication Storage
Cost (in ms) Cost (in bytes) Cost (in bits)
Das et al. [11] 8.22 35 256
Turkanovic et al. [15] 8.22 35 256
Chang-Le [16] 40.53 51 378
Gope-Hwang [17] 8.22 35 128
Our 6.34 32 Nil
sensor node does not require to store any secret credentials in
its memory, the storage cost of the proposed scheme is nil
for the sensor node point of view. Conclusively, from Tables
II, III, IV and V we can argue that the performance of the
proposed scheme is better than other schemes [11], [15], [16],
[17], and hence, it is more suitable for designing any secure
IWSN as compared to other schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article proposes a lightweight and physically secure
mutual authentication protocol for IWSN. In the proposed
protocol, we used lightweight cryptographic primitives, such
as one-way hash function, physically uncloneable function and
bitwise XOR operations. In the comparative summary, we
demonstrated that the proposed scheme ensures several im-
perative security features and incurs lower computation, com-
munication, and storage costs. Hence, the proposed scheme is
more suitable for IWSN security in comparison to the other
existing schemes.
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